To my great delight, recently in Korea there has been renewed tensions along the border. This isn't delightful because I like conflict. It is delightful because recently my class has been studying game theory and this is exactly the type of situation to demonstrate the real life application of mutually assured destruction. Two nations, side by side, a potential powder keg that I don't think will ever go off. At least not until the balance of power changes which essentially means not until the US or China stop backing either side of the line.
It seems to me that Attack/Attack is a weakly dominant strategy...
ReplyDeleteGiven that North Korea attacks, South Korea is indifferent between attacking and chest thumping. Given the North Korea chest thumps, South Korea is better off attacking.
So should I be looking at something more like this? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFQ-snfy2AM
ReplyDeleteHow would you frame that?
Thanks for the link--I agree that anything except chest thumping/chest thumping is a nash equilibrium, so my statement about attack/attack being a weakly dominant strategy didn't mean very much.
ReplyDeleteI can imagine a game with two countries in which the choices are peaceful or warlike. If both countries choose peaceful, then everybody gets along and John Lennon is happy. If both countries are warlike, it sort of sucks, cold war or something. If one country is warlike and the other is peaceful, then the warlike country totally dominates the peaceful country, which is the best for the warlike country and the worst for the peaceful country. Then the only Nash equilibrium is warlike/warlike.